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Abstract
In this paper we present a new proof of Solovay’s theorem on arithmetical
completeness of Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL. Originally, completeness of GL
with respect to interpretation of  as provability in PA was proved by R. Solovay
in 1976. The key part of Solovay’s proof was his construction of an arithmetical
evaluation for a given modal formula that made the formula unprovable in PA
if it were unprovable in GL. The arithmetical sentences for the evaluations were
constructed using certain arithmetical fixed points. The method developed by
Solovay have been used for establishing similar semantics for many other logics.
In our proof we develop new more explicit construction of required evaluations
that doesn’t use any fixed points in their definitions. To our knowledge, it is the
first alternative proof of the theorem that is essentially different from Solovay’s
proof in this key part.
1 Introduction
The study of provability as a modality could be traced back to at least as early as
K. Go¨del work [Go¨33]. M.H. Lo¨b [Lo¨55] have proved a generalization of Go¨del’s
Second Incompleteness Theorem that is now known as Lo¨b’s Theorem. In order to
formulate his theorem Lo¨b have stated conditions on provability predicates that are
now known as Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions. Despite Lo¨b haven’t men-
tioned the interpretation of a modality as a provability predicate there, his conditions
essentially corresponded to the standard axiomatization of modal logic K4. Also note
that arithmetical soundness of Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL immediately follows
from Lo¨b’s Theorem.
The axioms of modal system GL have first appeared in [Smi63]. K. Segerberg have
shown that GL is Kripke-complete and moreover that it is complete with respect to
the class of all finite transitive irreflexive trees [Seg71]. The arithmetical completeness
of the system GL were established by R.M. Solovay [Sol76]. Solovay have proved that
a modal formula ϕ is a theorem of GL iff for every arithmetical evaluation f(x) the
arithmetical sentence f(ϕ) is provable in PA.
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Latter modifications of Solovay’s method were used in order to prove a lot of other
similar results, we will mention just few of them. G.K. Japaridze have proved arith-
metical completeness of polymodal provability logic GLP [Jap86]. V.Yu. Shavrukov
[Sha88] and A. Berarducci [Ber90] have determined the interpretability logic of PA.
The key part of Solovay’s proof was to show that in certain sense every finite GL-
model is “embeddable” in arithmetic. Using the construction of “embeddings”, it is
easy to construct evaluations fϕ(x) such that PA 0 fϕ(ϕ), for all GL-unprovable modal
formulas ϕ. In order to construct the “embeddings”, Solovay have used Diagonal
Lemma to define certain primitive-recursive function (Solovay function), for every
finite GL Kripke model. Then, using the functions, Solovay have defined the sentences
that constituted the “embeddings”.
D. de Jongh, M. Jumelet, and F. Montagna have shown that GL is complete with
respect to Σ1-provability predicates for theories T ⊇ I∆0+Exp [dJJM91]. Their proof
have avoided the use of Solovay functions, however, their construction still “emulated”
Solovay’s approach using individual sentences constructed by Diagonal Lemma.
In a discussion on FOM (Foundation of Mathematics mailing list) J. Shipman
have asked a question about important theorems that have “essentially” only one
proof [Shi09]. The example of Solovay’s theorem were provided by G. Sambin. To the
author knowledge, up to the date there were no proofs of Solovay’s theorem that have
avoided the central idea of Solovay’s proof — the Solovay’s method of constructing
required sentences in terms of certain fixed points.
We note that completeness of some extensions of GL with respect to interpretations
of  that are similar to formalized provability were proved by the completely different
methods. Solovay in his paper [Sol76] have briefly mentioned a method of determining
modal logics of several natural interpretations of  in set theory, namely for the
interpretations of  as “to be true in all transitive models” and as “to be true in
all models Vκ, where κ is an inaccessible cardinal” (there are more detailed proofs
in G. Boolos book [Boo95, Chapter 13]). A modification of the method also have
been used to show completeness of wide variety of extensions of GL with respect to
artificially defined (not Σ1) provability-like predicates [Pak16].
In the paper we present a new approach to the proof of arithmetical completeness
theorem for GL. We introduce a different method of “embedding” of finite GL Kripke
models. As the result, the completeness of GL is achieved with the use of evaluations
given by more explicitly constructed and more “natural” sentences (in particular, we
do not rely on Diagonal Lemma in the construction). In order to avoid potential
misunderstanding, we note that despite the sentences from evaluations are given ex-
plicitly, our proof rely on Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem and the results by
P. Pudla´k [Pud86] that were proved with the use of Diagonal Lemma.
Now we will give an example of unprovable GL-formula ϕ and an evaluation f(x)
provided by our proof such that PA 0 f(ϕ). We consider the formula
ϕ⇌ ♦v → (♦u→ ♦(v ∧ u)).
We use the following definitions for numerical functions in order to define the evalu-
ation f(x):
exp(x) = 2x, log(x) = max({y | exp(y) ≤ x} ∪ 0),
exp⋆(x) = exp(exp(. . . exp(︸ ︷︷ ︸
x times
0) . . .)), log⋆(x) = max({y | exp⋆(y) ≤ x} ∪ 0)
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(note that the functions exp⋆(x) and log⋆(x) are called super exponentiation and super
logarithmic functions, respectively). The evaluation f(x) is given as following:
f(v)⇌ ∃x(Prf(x, p0 = 1q) ∧ ∀y < x(¬Prf(y, p0 = 1q)) ∧ log⋆(x) ≡ 0 (mod 2)),
f(u)⇌ ∃x(Prf(x, p0 = 1q) ∧ ∀y < x(¬Prf(y, p0 = 1q)) ∧ log⋆(x) ≡ 1 (mod 2)).
We note that that somewhat similar approach based on the parity of log⋆ were
used by Solovay in his letter to E. Nelson [Sol86]. Solovay proved that there are
sentences F and G such that I∆0 + Ω1 + F and I∆0 + Ω1 + G are cut-interpretable in
I∆0 + Ω1, but I∆0 + Ω1+F∧G isn’t cut-interpretable in I∆0 + Ω1. Also, H. Kotlarski
in [Kot96] have used an explicit parity-based construction of a pair of sentences in
order to give an alternative proof for Rosser’s Theorem.
2 Preliminaries
Let us first define Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL. The language of GL extends the
language of propositional calculus with propositional constants⊤ (truth) and⊥ (false)
by the unary modal connective . GL have the following Hilbert-style deductive
system:
1. axiom schemes of classical propositional calculus PC;
2. (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ);
3. (ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ;
4. ϕ ϕ→ψ
ψ
;
5. ϕ
ϕ
.
The expression ♦ϕ is an abbreviation for ¬¬ϕ.
A set with a binary relation (W,≺) is called irreflexive transitive tree if
1. ≺ is a transitive irreflexive relation;
2. there is an element r ∈W that is called the root of (W,≺) such that the upward
cone {a | r ≺ a} coincides with W ;
3. for any element w ∈ W the restriction of ≺ on the downward cone {a | a ≺ w}
is a strict well-ordering order.
Segerberg [Seg71] have shown that the logic GL is complete with respect to the class
of all finite irreflexive transitive trees.
Our proof relies on the results by R. Verbrugge and A. Visser [VV94] and indi-
rectly on the results by P. Pudla´k [Pud86]. This results are sensitive to details of
formalization of some metamathematical notions. Thus unlike some other papers,
where this kind of details could be safely be left unspecified, we will need to be more
careful here.
We identify syntactical expressions with binary strings. We encode binary strings
by positive integers numbers. A positive integer n of the form 1ak−1 . . . a0 in binary
notation encodes the binary string ak−1 . . . a0. We note that the binary logarithm
log(n) of a number n coincides with the length of the binary string that the number n
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encodes. For a formula F the number n that encodes F is known as the Go¨del number
of F.
A proof of an arithmetical formula ϕ in an arithmetical theory T is a list of
arithmetical formulas such that it ends with ϕ and every formula in the list is either
an axiom of T, or is an axiom of predicate calculus, or is obtained by inference rules
from previous formulas.
We will be interested in formalization of provability in the theory PA and its
extensions by finitely many axioms. We take the standard axiomatization of PA (by
axioms of Robinson arithmetic Q and the induction schema). We consider the natural
axiomatization in arithmetic of the property of a number to be the Go¨del number of
some axiom of PA. For all extensions T of PA by finitely many axioms this gives us
∆0-predicates PrfT(x, y) that are natural formalizations of “x is a proof of the formula
with Go¨del number y in the theory T” that is based on the definition of the notion
of proof given above. And we obtain Σ1-provability predicates
PrvT(y)⇌ ∃xPrfT(x, y).
We will use effective binary numerals. The n-th numeral is defined as follows:
1. 0 is the term 0;
2. 1 is the term 1;
3. 2n is the term (1 + 1) ·n;
4. 2n+ 1 is the term (1 + 1) ·n+ 1.
Clearly, the length of n is O(log(n)).
For an arithmetical formula F we denote by pFq the n-th numeral, where n is the
Go¨del number of the formula F.
We denote by Prv(x) and Prf(x, y) the predicates PrvPA(x) and PrfPA(x, y).
An arithmetical evaluation is a function f(x) from GL formulas to the sentences
of the language of first-order arithmetic such that
1. f(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇌ f(ϕ) ∧ f(ψ);
2. f(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇌ f(ϕ) ∨ f(ψ);
3. f(¬ϕ)⇌ ¬f(ϕ);
4. f(ϕ→ ψ)⇌ f(ϕ→ ψ);
5. f(⊤)⇌ 0 = 0;
6. f(⊥)⇌ 0 = 1;
7. f(ϕ)⇌ Prv(pf(ϕ)q).
Note that an arithmetical evaluation is uniquely determined by its values on propo-
sitional variables u, v, . . ..
We will use ⊤, ⊥, , and ♦ within arithmetical formulas: the expression ⊤ is an
abbreviation for 0 = 0, the expression ⊥ is an abbreviation for 0 = 1, the expres-
sion F is an abbreviation for Prv(pFq), and the expression ♦F is an abbreviation
for ¬Prv(p¬Fq). The expressions of the form nF and ♦nF are abbreviations for
 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
F and ♦♦ . . .♦︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
F, respectively.
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3 Proof of Solovay’s Theorem
In the section we will just give a proof of “completeness part” of Solovay’s theorem.
Soundness of the logic GL essentially is due to Lo¨b [Lo¨55] and we refer a reader to
Boolos book [Boo95, Chapter 3] for a detailed proof.
Theorem 1. If a modal formula ϕ is not provable in GL then there exists an arith-
metical evaluation f(x) such that PA 0 f(ϕ).
Let us fix some modal formula ϕ that is not provable in GL. By Segerberg’s result
[Seg71], we can find a finite transitive irreflexive tree F = (W,≺) such that r is the
root of F and there is a model M on F with M, r 1 ϕ. For all the worlds a of F we
denote by h(a) their “height”:
h(a) = sup({0} ∪ {h(b) + 1 | a ≺ b}).
Let us assign arithmetical sentences Ca to all the worlds a of F. We put Cr to be
0 = 0. We consider a non-leaf world a and assign sentences Cb to all its immediate
successors b. Suppose b0, . . . , bn are all the immediate successors of a. We fix some
enumeration b0, . . . , bn such that h(bn) = h(a) − 1. For i < n we put Cbi to be the
sentence
∃x(PrfPA+♦h(a)−1⊤(x, p0 = 1q) ∧ ∀y < x(¬PrfPA+♦h(a)−1⊤(y, p0 = 1q))
∧ log⋆(x) ≡ i (mod n+ 1)
∧ ∃y < exp(exp(x))(Prf
PA+♦h(bi)⊤(y, p0 = 1q))).
The sentence Cbn is
h(a)⊥ ∧
∧
i<n
¬Cbi .
Note that PA ⊢ ¬(Cbi ∧ Cbj ), for i 6= j and
PA ⊢ h(a)⊥ ↔
∨
i≤n
Cbi .
We note that all Cbi are PA-equivalent to Σ1-sentences: it is obvious for i 6= n and
Cbn is equivalent to Σ1-sentence since it states that there is a PA + ♦
h(a)−1⊤-proof
of 0 = 1 and in addition it states that the least PA+ ♦h(a)−1⊤-proof of 0 = 1 satisfy
certain ∆0(exp)-property.
We assign sentences Fa to all the worlds a of F. The sentence Fa is
∧
ba
Cb ∧ ♦
h(a)⊤.
It is easy to see that the disjunction of all Fa’s is provable in PA and any conjunction
Fa ∧ Fb, for a 6= b, is disprovable in PA.
Lemma 1. For any set of worlds A we have
PA+h(r)+1⊥ ⊢ ♦
( ∨
a∈A
Fa
)
↔
∨
b,∃a∈A(b≺a)
Fb.
Let us first prove Theorem 1 using Lemma 1 and only then prove the lemma.
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Proof. For a variable v we assign the evaluation f(v):
∨
M,av
Fa.
By induction on the length of modal formulas ψ we prove that
PA+h(r)+1⊥ ⊢ f(ψ)↔
∨
M,aψ
Fa.
The only non-trivial case for the induction step is when the topmost connective of ψ
is modality. Assume ψ is of the form χ. From inductive assumption we know that
PA ⊢ h(r)+1⊥ → (f(χ)↔
∨
M,aχ
Fa).
We use Lemma 1:
PA+h(r)+1⊥ ⊢ f(χ)↔ (f(χ))
↔ (h(r)+1⊥ ∧ f(χ))
↔ (h(r)+1⊥ ∧
∨
M,aχ
Fa)
↔ (
∨
M,aχ
Fa)
↔ (¬
∨
M,a¬χ
Fa)
↔ ¬♦(
∨
M,a¬χ
Fa)
↔ ¬
∨
M,a♦¬χ
Fa.
↔
∨
M,aχ
Fa.
Therefore,
PA+h(r)+1⊥ ⊢ f(ϕ)↔
∨
M,aϕ
Fa.
Since M, r 1 ϕ, we have PA + h(r)+1⊥ + Fr ⊢ ¬f(ϕ). The sentence Fr is just
equivalent to ♦h(r)⊤. Hence, by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem for PA +
♦h(r)⊤, the theory PA +h(r)+1⊥+ Fr is consistent. Therefore, ¬f(ϕ) is consistent
with PA and thus PA 0 f(ϕ).
In order to prove Lemma 1, clearly, it will be enough to prove the following two
lemmas:
Lemma 2. For any world a from F, we have
PA+h(r)+1⊥ ⊢ ♦Fa →
∨
b≺a
Fb.
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Proof. Let us reason in PA + h(r)+1⊥. Assume ♦Fa. We need to prove
∨
b≺a
Fb. Let
us denote by r = c0 ≺ c1 ≺ . . . ≺ cn = a the maximal chain from r to a. Let us find
the greatest k such that Cck holds.
Note that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n the sentence h(ci−1)⊥ implies Cci . Indeed, 
h(ci−1)⊥
implies that Cc for some immediate successor c of ci−1. But since Cc is Σ1 and we
assumed ♦Fa, we would have ♦(Fa ∧ Cc), which is possible only for c = ci.
By a simple check of cases k = 0 and k 6= 0 we obtain h(ck)+1⊥. Therefore, for
all i < k, we have h(ci)⊥ and hence, for all i ≤ k, the sentence Cci holds. From
(Fa → ♦h(a)⊤) and ♦Fa we derive ♦h(a)+1⊤. Thus, ¬Ca and hence k < n. Since
h(ck)⊥ implies Cck+1 , we have ♦
h(ck)⊤. Therefore the sentence Fck holds and finally
we derive
∨
b≺a
Fb.
Lemma 3. For any worlds a ≺ b, we have PA+ h(r)+1⊥ ⊢ Fa → ♦Fb.
We will use model-theoretic methods in our proof of Lemma 3. More precisely,
we will need to use within PA some facts that we will establish using model-theoretic
methods. There is an approach to formalization in arithmetic of results obtained by
model-theoretic methods that is based on the use of the systems of the second-order
arithmetic. In particular there is a well-known system ACA0 that is a conservative
extension of PA. We will use the formalization of model-theoretic notions in systems of
second-order arithmetic that could be found in S. Simpson book [Sim09, Section II.8,
Section IV.3].
The key model-theoretic result that we use is the Injecting Inconsistencies The-
orem. We will use the version of the theorem that is a corollary of the version of
the theorem that were proved by A. Visser and R. Verbrugge [VV94, Theorem 5.1].
Earlier similar results are due to P. Ha´jek, R. Solovay, J. Kraj´ıcˇek, and P. Pudla´k
[Ha´84, Sol89, KP89].
Definition 1. Suppose M is a model of PA. We denote by M ↾ a the structure with
the domain {e ∈ M | M |= e ≤ a} the constant 0 and partial functions S, +, and ·
induced by M on the domain. For two structures A and B with the constant 0 and
(maybe) partial functions S, +, and · we write
1. A ⊆ B if the domain of A is a subset of the domain ofB and for any arithmetical
term t(x1, . . . , xn) and elements q1, . . . , qn ∈ A:
(a) if p is the value of t(q1, . . . , qn) inB and p ∈ A then the value of t(q1, . . . , qn)
is defined in A and is equal to p,
(b) if p is the value of t(q1, . . . , qn) in A then the value of t(q1, . . . , qn) is defined
in B and is equal to p;
2. A = B if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A.
We note that the definition actually could also be applied to models of I∆0.
We will show in Appendix B that the following theorem is formalizable in ACA0:
Theorem 2. Let T be an extension of PA by finitely many axioms. Let ConT(x)
denote the formula ∀y(log(y) ≤ x → ¬PrfT(y, p0 = 1q)). Let M be a non-standard
countable model of T. And let q, p be nonstandard elements of M such that M |= q ≤ p
and M |= ConT(pk), for all standard k. Then there exists a countable model N of T
such that p ∈ N and
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1. M ↾ p = N ↾ p;
2. M ↾ exp(pk) ⊆ N, for all standard k;
3. N |= ¬ConT(pq);
4. N |= ConT(pk), for all standard k.
Let us now prove Lemma 3 using the formalization of Theorem 2.
Proof. It would be enough to prove the lemma for the case when b is an immediate
successor of a. Indeed, after that we will be able to derive ♦nFb for any b, a ≺ b,
where n is the length of the maximal chain from a to b; next we could conclude that
we have the required ♦Fb.
Now let us consider the case when b is an immediate successor of a and is bk in
our fixed order b0, . . . , bn of the immediate successors of a.
For the rest of the proof we reason in ACA0 + Fa + 
h(r)+1⊥ in order to show
that we have ♦Fb; since ACA0 is a conservative extension of PA, this will conclude the
proof.
Since we have ♦h(a)⊤, we could construct a model M of PA+♦h(a)−1⊤. Suppose
v ∈ M is the least PA + ♦h(a)−1⊤-proof of 0 = 1 in M, if there exists one and
an arbitrary nonstandard number, otherwise. Note that since we have ♦h(a)⊤, the
element v couldn’t be standard. Next we find some nonstandard u ∈M such that
1. M |= exp(exp(u)) < v,
2. M |= log⋆(u+ 1) ≡ k − 1 (mod n+ 1),
3. M |= log⋆(u) ≡ k − 2 (mod n+ 1).
We can find u with this properties since we know that the functions exp(x) and
exp⋆(x) are total on standard natural numbers and hence we know that the functions
log(x) and log⋆(x) map nonstandard elements to nonstandard elements in M.
Now we apply Theorem 2 to the model M with p = u and q = log(u) + 1. We
obtain a model M′ of PA+♦h(a)−1⊤ such that M ↾ u = M′ ↾ u and there is the least
PA+ ♦h(a)−1⊤-proof d ∈M′ of 0 = 1 such that
M′ |= u+ 1 < u2 < log(d) ≤ ulog(u)+1 ≤ exp((log(u) + 1)2) < exp(u).
Thus,
M′ |= log⋆(d) ≡ k (mod n+ 1).
If h(b) = h(a)− 1, then we have constructed a model of PA+ Cb + ♦h(b)⊤.
Assume h(b) < h(a)− 1. Clearly, there are no PA+♦h(b)⊤-proofs of 0 = 1 in M′.
We apply Theorem 2 to M′ with p = dlog(d)+1 and q = log(d)+1. We obtain a model
M′′ of PA+ ♦h(b)⊤ such that
M′ ↾ dlog(d)+1 = M′′ ↾ dlog(d)+1,
there is a PA + ♦h(b)⊤-proof of 0 = 1 in M′′ and for the least PA + ♦h(b)⊤-proof
e ∈M′′ of 0 = 1 we have
M′′ |= log(e) ≤ d(log(d)+1)
2
≤ exp((log(d) + 1)3) < exp(d).
Since M′ ↾ dlog(d)+1 = M′′ ↾ dlog(d)+1 and Prf(x, y) is a ∆0 predicate, we see that d is
the least PA+♦h(a)−1⊤-proof of 0 = 1 inM′′. HenceM′′ is a model of PA+Cb+♦h(b)⊤.
Thus, under no additional assumptions, we have a model of PA+Cb+♦
h(b)⊤. Since
all Cc, for c  a, are Σ1-sentences, actually we have a model of PA + Fb. Therefore,
♦Fb.
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4 Conclusions
In the present paper we have gave a new method of constructing arithmetical eval-
uations of modal formulas from a given Kripke model and proved arithmetical com-
pleteness of GL with respect to provability in PA using the method. We consider the
evaluations that have been constructed in the paper to be more “natural” than the
evaluations provided by Solovay’s proof.
We proved the theorem specifically for the standard provability predicate for PA.
It is unclear to author, for what exact class of provability predicates our methods are
applicable. The most essential limitation for our technique seems to be the fact that
it relies on the formalized version of Theorem 2. It seems very likely that for theories
that are stronger than PA one could apply our method with only minor adjustments.
In particular, it seems that for a general result one would need to modify Prf-predicates
while preserving Prv-predicate (up to provable equivalence) in order to ensure that
[VV94, Theorem 5.1] is applicable. For theories that are weaker than PA, there
are more significant problems with adopting our technique. Namely, our technique
essentially relies on formalized version of the Injecting Inconsistencies Theorem. And
the proofs of stronger versions of this theorem [KP89, VV94] essentially rely on the
Omitting Types Theorem. We have provided a proof of the Omitting Types Theorem
in ACA0 in Appendix A, but it is not clear whether it could be done in weaker
systems. The author is not familiar with results that calibrate reverse mathematics
strength of the required version of the Omitting Types Theorem. We note that reverse
mathematics analysis of other version of Omitting Types Theorem have been done
by D. Hirschfeldt, R. Shore and T. Slaman [HSS09], in particular from their results
it follows that their version of the Omitting Types Theorem is not provable in WKL0
but follows from RT2
2
(and thus couldn’t be equivalent to ACA0 over RCA0). But
nevertheless, we conjecture that the same kind of evaluations as we have gave in
Section 3 will provide completeness of GL for all finitely axiomatizable extensions of
I∆0 + Exp.
Also, since the technique that were introduced in the paper is significantly different
from Solovay’s technique, it seems plausible that it may give some advantage for some
open problems, for which Solovay’s method have been the “default approach” before
(see [BV06] for open problems in provability logic).
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A Formalization of the Omitting Types Theorem
In order to formalize Theorem 2 in ACA0 we will first show that the Omitting Types
Theorem is formalizable in ACA0. We will adopt the proof from [CK90]. We remind
a reader that we use the approach to formalization of model theory from Simpson
book [Sim09].
Definition 2 (ACA0). Let T be a first-order theory and Σ = Σ(x1, . . . , xn) be a set
of formulas of the language of T that have no free variables other than x1, . . . , xn. We
say that that T locally omits Σ if for every formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) at least one of the
following fails:
1. the theory T+ ϕ is consistent;
2. for all ψ ∈ Σ we have T ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xn(ϕ→ ψ).
We say that a model M of T omits Σ if for any a1, . . . , an ∈ M there is a formula
ψ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Σ such that M 6|= ψ(a1, . . . , an).
Theorem 3 (ACA0). Suppose T is a consistent theory that locally omits the set of
formulas Σ(x1, . . . , xn). Then there is a model M of T that omits the set Σ.
Proof. We will follow the proof of [CK90, Theorem 2.2.9] but make sure that our
arguments could be carried out in ACA0.
We will prove the theorem for n = 1, i.e. Σ = Σ(x). The case n > 1 could be
proved essentially the same way, but the notations would be more complicated.
We extend the language of T by fresh constants c0, c1, . . .. We arrange all sentences
of the extended language in a sequence ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . (since we work in ACA0 the formulas
are encoded by Go¨del numbers and we could arrange them by their Go¨del numbers).
We will construct a sequence of finite sets of sentences
∅ = U0 ⊂ U1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Um ⊂ . . .
such that for every m we have the following:
1. Um is consistent with T;
2. either ϕm ∈ Um+1 or ¬ϕm ∈ Um+1;
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3. if ϕm is of the form ∃xψ(x) and ϕm ∈ Um+1 then ψ(cp) ∈ Um+1, where cp is
the first ci that doesn’t occur in Um or ϕm;
4. there is a formula χ(x) ∈ Σ such that ¬χ(cm) ∈ Um+1.
We will give the definition that will determine unique sequence U0,U1, . . .. We
want to make sure that for our definition of the sequence U0,U1, . . ., the property
of a number x to be the code of the sequence 〈U0,U1, . . . ,Uy〉 is expressible by a
formula without second-order quantifiers. If we will ensure this, then we will be able
to construct a set that encodes the sequence U0,U1, . . . ,Um, . . . using the arithmetic
comprehension.
Let us define Um+1 in terms of Um. If ϕm is consistent with T ∪ Um then we
put σm to be ϕm. Otherwise we put σm to be ¬ϕm. If σm is ϕm and is of the form
∃xψ(x) then we put ξm to be ψ(cp), where cp is the first ci that doesn’t occur in Um
or ϕm. Otherwise, we put ξm to be equal to σm. We choose the formula χ(x) with
the smallest Go¨del number such that χ(x) ∈ Σ and T 0
∧
Um → χ(cm). We put
Um+1 = Um ∪ {ξm, σm, χ(cm)}.
It is easy to see that for this definition, indeed, we could express by a formula with-
out second-order quantifiers the property of a number x to be the code of the sequence
〈U0,U1, . . . ,Uy〉. By a trivial induction on y we could prove that for every y the said
sequence exists and unique. Thus, we have obtained the sequence U0,U1, . . . ,Um, . . .
encoded by a set.
Now, using the definition of the sequence, we could easily prove that the sequence
satisfy the conditions 1., 2., 3., and 4.
We consider the union T∪
⋃
i∈N
Ui = T
′. By condition 1. the theory T′ is consistent.
By condition 2. the theory T′ is complete. By condition 3. the theory T′ gives the
truth definition with Tarski conditions for a model with the domain {c0, c1, . . .}; this
gives us a model M of T′ with the domain {c0, c1, . . .}. By condition 4. the model M
omits the set Σ.
B Formalization of the Injecting Inconsistencies The-
orem
Now we are going to check that Theorem 2 is provable in ACA0. Below we assume
that a reader is familiar with the paper [VV94] and we will use some notions from
the paper without giving the definitions here.
Theorem 4. Let R ⊂ I∆0 + Ω1 be a finitely axiomatizable theory. Then ACA0 proves
the following:
Let T ⊇ I∆0 + Ω1 be a Σb1-axiomatized theory for which the small reflection
principle is provable in R. Let ConT(x) denote the formula ∀y(log(y) ≤ x →
¬PrfT(y, p0 = 1q)). Let M be a non-standard model of T and let c, a be nonstan-
dard elements of M such that M |= c ≤ a, exp(ac) ∈ M, and M |= ConT(ak), for all
standard k. Then there exists a model K of T such that a ∈ K and
1. M ↾ a = K ↾ a;
2. M ↾ exp(ak) ⊆ K, for all standard k;
3. K |= ¬ConT(ac);
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4. for all standard k we have K |= ConT(ak);
5. K |= exp(ac) ↓.
Proof. Essentially, we just need to formalize the proof of [VV94, Theorem 5.1] in
ACA0. The only difference between our formulation and the formulation by A. Visser
and R. Verbrugge is that we have replaced the requirement that the small reflection
principle is provable in I∆0 + Ω1 with a stronger requirement that states that the
small reflection principle is provable in R. First, we show how to formalize the proof
itself and then explain why the results used in the proof are formalizable in ACA0.
The only non-trivial part of the formalization of the proof itself is the issue with
the lack of truth definition for the cut
N = {u ∈M | u < exp(ak), for some standard k}
of M. However, for the purposes of the proof, it would be enough for N to be a
weak model (i.e. poses truth definition only for axioms, [Sim09, Definition II.8.9]).
Moreover, unlike the original proof of Visser and Verbrugge, we just need N to be
a weak model of R + BΣ1 rather than a model of BΣ1 + Ω1. And since R is exter-
nally fixed finitely axiomatizable theory, we could create the required truth definition
straightforward using arithmetical comprehension. Other parts of the proof could be
formalized without any complications.
The proof of [VV94, Theorem 5.1] used A. Wilkie and J. Paris result [WP89,
Theorem 1], Pudla´k results from [Pud86], and the Omitting Types Theorem. We
have already formalized the Omitting Types Theorem in Appendix A. The proof of
[WP89, Theorem 1] is trivial and could be easily formalized in ACA0. The technique
of [Pud86] is purely finitistic and thus could be easily formalized in ACA0.
Now we want to derive the formalization of Theorem 2 from Theorem 4. In
order to do it, we first need to fix some finite fragment R ⊂ I∆0 + Ω1. And next
we need to show in ACA0 that all the extensions of PA by finitely many axioms
are Σb1-axiomatizable extensions of I∆0 + Ω1 for which R proves the small reflection
principle. Obviously, extensions of PA by finitely many axioms are Σb1-axiomatizable
(and it could be checked in ACA0).
In [VV94, Theorem 4.20] it were established that I∆0 + Ω1 proves small reflection
principle for I∆0 + Ω1. By inspecting the proof, it is easy to see that it is possible to
use only finitely many axioms of I∆0 + Ω1 in order to prove all the instances of the
small reflection principle. Now we will indicate how to modify the proof of [VV94,
Theorem 4.20] in order to prove in a finite fragment of I∆0 + Ω1 all the instances
of the small reflection principle for all the extensions of PA by finitely many axioms.
Actually, the only part of the proof that should be changed is [VV94, Lemma 4.16] that
were needed to deal with the schema of ∆0-induction schema in the case of I∆0 + Ω1-
provability. For our adaptation we need to replace it with the analogous lemma that
will deal with schema of full induction in the case of provability in PA. This analogous
lemma could be proved essentially in the same way as [VV94, Lemma 4.16] itself with
the only difference that the last part of the proof that were reducing an instance
of induction schema to an instance of ∆0-induction schema will not be needed any
longer. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2 in ACA0.
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